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Abstract: 
This paper discusses the interplay between the choice of the discount rate, greenhouse gas 
mitigation and endogenous technological change. Neglecting the issue of uncertainty it is 
shown that the green golden rule stock of atmospheric carbon is uniquely determined, but is 
not affected by technological change. More general it is shown analytically within the 
framework of a reduced model of integrated assessment that optimal stationary stocks of 
atmospheric carbon depend on the choice of the discount rate, but are independent of the 
stock of technological knowledge. These results are then reinforced numerically in a fully 
specified integrated assessment analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
Two aspects are of importance for the future of the global climate and, to a certain extent, 
for the future of the human society. On the one hand this is the timing of greenhouse gas 
emissions, and it is the de-carbonization of the economy on the other. The reason is quite 
obvious. Because of the tremendous inertia of the climate system, the earlier greenhouse 
gas emissions are abated, and the earlier less carbon intense or even carbon free technolo-
gies are innovated, the lower will be the human impact on the global climate, and hence the 
lower are the costs, future generations have to bear. 
Today, more than eighty percent of the world’s energy demand is covered by fossil fuels. 
This explains why energy consumption is the most important source of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions. And there is still increasing need for energy, mainly because of the energy hunger 
of the developing countries. Therefore, high demand for fossil fuels is likely to persist into 
the future. This is in not in line with the policy recommendations of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001). The IPCC suggests a stabilization of the atmospheric 
carbon concentration, which, however, requires eliminating global carbon emissions almost 
completely within the next two centuries. Therefore, answering the question of how to de-
carbonize the world economy plays a key role in the solution of the global climate problem. 
There is empirical evidence that de-carbonization has already taken place in almost any part 
of the world (see Nakicenovic, 2002). For example, in the United States the amount of car-
bon that today is emitted per dollar value added accounts to only ten percent of the amount 
which was released hundred years ago. But despite of that carbon dioxide emissions have 
risen over the last two centuries and still continue to rise. How can this be explained? Typi-
cally it is argued that because of the so-called rebound effect (see Birol and Keppler, 2000) 
the rate at which de-carbonization has taken place through the innovation of more energy 
efficient technologies is significantly smaller than the rate of growth of demand for carbon 
energy and hence of carbon dioxide emissions. Or to phrase it more frankly, economic 
growth simply has whipped out the de-carbonizing effect of technological change. 
This seemingly suggests that putting technological change into the driver’s seat is essential 
for the de-carbonization of the economy, but we cannot fully trust that technological inno-
vation by itself will guarantee a sufficient increase of energy efficiency on the one hand and 
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a reduction of the carbon intensity on the other. Of course, improving the energy efficiency 
initially stipulates a reduction of energy consumption and hence of emissions. A lower ener-
gy bill, however, implies that relative prices change and real incomes increase. Since relative 
prices matter, as a main lesson of economic theory tells, at the end of the reaction chain 
overall energy consumption might rise (see Brännlund et al., 2007). What is needed is get-
ting the prices right, which is nothing else than a modern manifestation of Hicks’ (1932) in-
duced innovation hypothesis.  
Both, greenhouse gas mitigation and technological innovation can be viewed as investment 
into the future. Consequently, intertemporal prices and thus the discount rate matters. For 
example, as Stephan and Müller-Fürstenberger (1998) have shown, there is an inverse rela-
tionship between the choice of the discount rate and greenhouse gas abatement. A rapid 
step up in near term abatement, even above long-run efficiency levels, is observed, if the 
future generations’ welfare is discounted at rate zero. In general, choosing a low discount 
rate implies that a high weight is put on the welfare of the future generations. Therefore one 
might expect that the lower is the discount rate the more is invested into both the future 
climate and the stock of technological knowledge. 
However, things turn out being more complex. For example, Goulder and Mathai (2000) 
have observed that there will be a delay in greenhouse gas mitigation, if improvements in 
abatement technologies are expected. For, if abatement costs will be reduced by technologi-
cal change, then it is profitable to abate more, but deferred into the future. Consequently, 
the choice of the discount rate seems to affect the interaction between greenhouse gas ab-
atement and technological innovation. 
This paper discusses the interplay between the choice of the discount rate, greenhouse gas 
mitigation and endogenous technological change both analytically and numerically.2
                                                 
2  In the past a lot has been published on the issue of evaluating costs and benefits of greenhouse gas mitiga-
tion, on the conflict between intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency, on the issue of dis-
counting for the short-run versus for the long-term, as well as on the related problem of how best to dis-
count the future in the case of uncertainty. (For an overview, see Portney and Weyant, 1999). However, 
these issues are not in the focus of this paper. 
 By 
adopting the concept of a maximal sustainable level of both consumption and environmental 
quality, which Chichilnisky et al. (1995) call green golden rule, it is shown that the green gol-
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den rule stock of atmospheric carbon is uniquely determined, independent of the stock of 
technological knowledge. 
This result is reinforced in a more general fashion. By introducing the concept of a modified 
green golden rule it is shown analytically within a reduced version of an integrated assess-
ment model that optimal stationary stocks of atmospheric carbon depend on the choice of 
the discount rate, but are independent of the technological change. This is also observed 
numerically within a fully specified integrated assessment model. But the numerical model 
shows a bit more. In particular it allows analyzing in detail, how economies develop over 
time and during transition to steady state. Thereby it becomes obvious: (1) over the long-run 
optimal program converge to stationary states, and (2) the process of approaching a statio-
nary atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is affected by technological change. In other 
words: What really matters over the long-run is the choice of the discount rate, but how fast 
a stationary atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is reached, depends on technological inno-
vation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple, analytically 
treatable model, where technological change results from research and development and 
affects the productivity of both carbon energy and physical capital. Section 3 establishes the 
concept of a modified green golden rule and presents the main results of this paper. Section 
4 discusses numerical results of an integrated assessment analysis of global climate change, 
which is based on the theoretical approach developed in Section 2. Section 5 concludes. 
2 The modeling framework 
Before proceeding to a numerical Integrated Assessment Analysis, let us clarify ideas by us-
ing a model, which is simple enough to be solved analytically. Time is taken as discrete and 
global climate change is viewed as public bad, which negatively affects the world's gross 
production (WP). In each period , the world product (net of climate damages) 
can be consumed or might be invested into physical capital as well as into a stock of tech-
nological knowledge. Inputs into world production are knowledge and physical capital. Fur-
thermore, greenhouse gas emissions, which, if measured in carbon equivalents, are directly 
governed by inputs of carbon energy, are viewed as inputs into production rather than a 
joint output.  
 5 
As was pointed out by Romer (1990), knowledge is different from other inputs such as ener-
gy or capital. Technological knowledge is an instruction for mixing together energy, raw ma-
terials and other services. That means in particular that technological progress introduces 
new devices into production, which, once discovered, can be applied as often as desired 
without any restrictions. Therefore, if we allow for greenhouse gas abatement through in-
duced technological change and / or substitution between physical capital and carbon ener-
gy, i.e. carbon emissions, the most simply way to represent world production is to use the 
following function (for a discussion, see Löschel, 2002) 
(2.1)  . 
 and  denote the inputs of conventional capital and carbon emissions, respectively.  is 
stock of technological knowledge and  are technology parameters.3
The right-hand side of inequality (2.3) indicates that the world product - net of climate dam-
ages - is allocated between consumption , investment into physical capital, , 
 
How greenhouse gas emissions affect the future climate, is captured by using a Nordhaus 
representation of the global carbon cycle 
(2.2)  . 
That means that the future stock  of atmospheric greenhouse gases depends on the 
present concentration  as well as global emissions .  is the factor by which natural abate-
ment reduces existing stocks of atmospheric greenhouse gases. 
Let the economic impact of global climate change be measured in terms of losses in world 
production. That means, global climate change directly affects the regions’ ability to produce 
private goods, but not utilities. Then feasibility requires that 
(2.3)   
for any t. 
                                                 
3  Since knowledge is a factor of production, investing into knowledge capital raises the productivity of re-
sources and result in non-environmental technical progress. As long as the output elasticity of knowledge is 
positive, the production will be characterized by increasing returns to scale, i.e. by endogenous technologi-
cal change as referred to by the new growth theory. 
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where  is the capital survival factor, and investment, , into the knowledge 
stock, where knowledge will erode at rate 1  without activity. 
The left-hand side of inequality (2.3) denotes the fraction of conventional world output (WP) 
that is at the society’s disposal. This is called Green World Product (GWP) and depends on 
the economic losses , which are negatively correlated to the stock of atmospheric car-
bon. That means, the more carbon is emitted, the higher will be the stock  of accumulated 
global emissions, and hence, the lower will be the fraction  of convention-
al output that is available in period t. More precisely we assume in the following that dam-
ages are strictly increasing, i.e., and  for all .  
An example of an economic loss factor, which typically is used in Integrated Assessment 
Analysis, where for the sake of simplicity both the thermal inertia lag between global con-
centrations and climate change as well as the cooling effects of aerosols and the heating 
effects of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide are neglected, is given by (see Manne 
et al., 1995) 
(2.4)  .  
 marks the critical value of the CO2-stock. At this hypothetical level, climate damage would 
consume all of conventional wealth.4
                                                 
4  In most studies the world's critical CO2 concentration level Ω is 1496 ppm. This implies that doubling the 
concentration of pre-industrial atmospheric carbon imposes market losses of 3.5 % of the world's gross 
product. 
 
3 Sustainable climate and (Modified) Green Golden Rule 
Among climate scientists there is general agreement that over the long run the stock of at-
mospheric carbon should be stabilized at levels, which are at least below catastrophic ones. 
Economists typically add that stabilizing the global climate must go hand in hand with an 
indefinitely maintainable level of consumption per capita. Both requirements are captured 
by the concept of the green golden rule. This concept was originally introduced by Chichil-
nisky et al. (1995), and considers a green golden rule a feasible path such that the long-run 
values of both consumption and the environment are maximized. 
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To adopt their concept, let  denote instantaneous utility, which is a concave function of con-
sumption . Recall that an infinite sequence  of stocks of technical 
knowledge , physical capital  and atmospheric carbon , respectively, is feasible path, 
if for any  condition (2.3) is fulfilled. A Green Golden Rule (GGR) is a feasible path, which 
maximizes 
  . 
Proposition 1: Let , then a Green Golden Rule exists and the GGR stock  of 
atmospheric carbon satisfies . 
Proof: Since for any  the maximand is independent of the values of , solving the 
optimality problem requires to find infinitely maintainable values of , which grant 
maximal consumption. Thus, the above problem reduces to 
  . 
Therefore, an interior solution must fulfill  
  , 
  , 
  . 
Now, let  denote the solution of the above problem. Then condition (3.3) imme-
diately implies 
  . 
This means in particular that, because of the properties of the damage function , the at-
mospheric GGR stock  is uniquely determined and independent of both of the capital and 
knowledge stock. Moreover, if , which is a realistic assumption, from the first two 
conditions the Green Golden Rule stocks of physical capital and knowledge can be derived, 
which are in turn uniquely determined.  
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Proposition 1 has an important implication. Sustainable climate, which yields maximal per 
capita consumption over the long-run, is independent of the stock of technological know-
ledge. Instead the atmospheric Green Golden Rule stock  solely depends on damages as 
well as the output elasticity  of physical capital. In case of the well-known damage function 
(2.4) we get 
  . 
For an illustrative example let . Then the Green Golden Rule carbon concentration 
would be around 669 ppm. This fits surprisingly well the results of more complex and de-
tailed integrated assessment analyses of global climate change (for example, see Nordhaus 
and Boyer, 2000). Note, this result implies in particular that the sustainable concentration of 
atmospheric carbon is above the presently existing level. Or to phrase it differently, com-
pared to optimal sustainable concentrations of atmospheric carbon the present generation 
enjoys an over-endowment of climate capital. We will return to this issue in Section 4. 
The Green Golden Rule is a particular type of a stationary path, i.e. a feasible path 
 such that  for a t. To see that, let 
 for all . Then a Green Golden Rule myopically maximizes profits at these prices 
(for a clarification, see Appendix 1). Now, since the Green Golden Rule is a stationary path 
which is myopically maximized profits at constant prices, i.e., prices embodying a proportio-
nality factor , this motivates to generalize our consideration by introducing the con-
cept of a Modified Green Golden Rule (MGGR) as follows. 
Definition: A stationary path, which myopically maximized profits at proportional prices 
 is called a Modified Green Golden Rule. 
Now, since a Modified Green Golden Rule is a feasible growth path, which for all  has to 
satisfy the stationary conditions , where  
  , 
then the first order conditions, which are both sufficient and necessary for short-run profit 
maximization, turn into  
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(3.1)  , 
(3.2)  , 
(3.3)  . 
Therefore, a feasible, stationary program  exists and defines a MGGR, if and only if 
it is a solution of conditions (3.1a) to (3.3a). 
Proposition 2: For any discount factor  a uniquely determined Modified Green Golden 
rule  exists, where the MGGR stock  of atmospheric carbon is inde-
pendent of both the knowledge stock  and the capital stock . Furthermore 
  . 
Proof: From condition (3.3) we get 
(3.3a)  , 
hence  
  . 
Because of the properties of the damage function , this uniquely determines a MGGR stock 
, which is independent of the knowledge stock as well as the stock of physical capital. 
Furthermore, through inserting  into conditions (3.1) and (3.2) both MGGR knowledge 
and capital stocks can be derived and are unique.  
Note, condition (3.3) implies 
  , 
which means in particular that at a Modified Green Golden Rule the elasticity of the climate 
damages directly corresponds to the difference of the discount factor and the natural re-
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creating rate. Now, if we a apply the specific damage functions as given in equation (2.4) we 
get 
  . 
For illustrative purposes, let as assume that utilities are discounted at 3%, that  and 
. This would imply a stationary stock of atmospheric carbon  of about 980 ppm. 
Condition (3.1) implicitly defines the stationary knowledge stock  as function of the stock 
of atmospheric carbon , the discount factor , and the capital stock  i.e. 
. Therefore, by applying the calculus of implicit functions, we have 
(3.4) . 
The negative sign follows from the assumption that , and , hence . Thus 
condition (3.3) implies . Furthermore we have 
(3.5)  , 
(3.6)   
Similar conditions hold true, if we replace the knowledge stock by the physical capital stock, 
i.e., . 
Proposition 2 and Condition (3.3a) allow defining the stationary stock of atmospheric car-
bon as a function of the discount factor  only. Hence 
(3.7)  , 
which immediately follows from the properties of the damage function . 
Now, taking together the results observed so far, we are able to analyze how the choice of 
the discount factor affects the stationary knowledge stock as well as stock of atmospheric 
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carbon. Recall that  and . Then because of conditions 
(3.5) to (3.7), taking the total differentials gives 
(3.8)  .  
Because of the consideration above, it follows that the right hands side of equation (2.12) is 
negative. Furthermore, since 
   
if  we have 
Proposition 3: For any , there exists a uniquely determined Modified Green Golden Rule 
. The MGG Rule stock  of atmospheric greenhouse gases depends mo-
notonously increasing on the discount factor  and if , then the MGGR 
knowledge stock  is negatively related with both  and . 
With a one-sector growth model a decrease of the discount rate always implies an increase 
of the optimal steady state capital stock. In the literature this phenomenon is called capital 
deepening (see Burmeister and Turnovsky, 1972). However, in models with heterogeneous 
capital such a response cannot be expected in general. For example, Burmeister and Tur-
novsky have shown that even in a well-behaved Cobb-Douglas world there is no unambi-
guous capital deepening. The possibility of substitution between different capital goods pro-
hibits any hope that the stocks of different capital goods will – in any case - move into the 
same direction. Our analysis, however, reveals that there will be no paradoxical effects. In 
any case there will be capital deepening in the sense that any increase of the discount rate 
implies a reduction of the stationary stocks of physical capital, knowledge capital as well as 
environmental capital, i.e., an increase of the stock of atmospheric carbon. 
Note finally that even if stationary stocks of atmospheric carbon are independent of tech-
nological knowledge, the path at which an economy approaches stationary values might be 
very well be governed by technological change. This becomes more obvious, once we turn to 
a dynamic integrated assessment analysis. 
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4 Computational Experiments  
Just at the beginning let us stress the purely illustrative purpose of the following experi-
ments. Or in other words: We are not interested in deriving policy recommendations. We 
are interested in generating additional insight through numerical thought experiments. As 
such our computational exercise employs the theoretical model, which we presented in Sec-
tion2. Compared to other models used in numerical Integrated Assessment Analyses our 
theoretical approach exhibits a higher degree of abstraction. In particular, inputs of carbon 
energy into production are not explicitly modeled. Instead, carbon emissions are viewed as 
inputs into production. This is a new and strong assumption to the Integrated Assessment 
literature, and it limits the comparability of our results to the results typically derived from 
models like DICE (see Nordhaus, 1993). Nonetheless, some key elements of our approach 
correspond one-to-one to modeling blocks of seminal Integrated Assessment Models. Exam-
ples are the damage assessment (see (2.4)) on the one hand and the representation of the 
carbon-cycle on the other (see (2.2)). 
Our calculations are based on the assumption that the world economy follows a Ramsey 
path, striking an optimal balance between consumption and investment into physical as well 
as knowledge capital. Formally that means solving the optimality problem 
  
subject to  
(2.3a) . 
Solutions are obtained via non-linear programming.  Computations are carried out with 
GAMS/Conopt3. We simulate 350 periods, but show only 250 to hide end of the horizon ef-
fects. Additionally, the results have been checked against the numerical solution of the first 
order optimality conditions.  
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4.1 Calibration and data 
There are only few parameters to be calibrated. Let us assume that output elasticizes of pro-
duction (see (2.1)) are  and , respectively. The natural rate of carbon decay is 
taken from the literature and account to one per cent, i.e., . Emissions are partially 
absorbed by the biosphere or stored in the upper ocean, therefore the fraction of annual 
carbon emissions which eventually enters the atmosphere, is 0.302. I.e., the fully specified 
carbon accumulation equation (2.2) reads 
 . 
Just as in the existing literature (see Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) the economic loss function 
(2.4) is calibrated such a doubling of the pre-industrial carbon concentration causes market 
damages of 3.5 per cent of world gross output (recall Footnote 4). Depreciation rates on 
physical capital and on knowledge are  and , respectively (see Bernstein 
and Manumeas, 2006 for estimates of εH). 
4.2 Descriptive versus prescriptive view 
There are polar views on the issue of global climate change. On one hand, one could take a 
descriptive view. This would mean to place the global climate problem into the framework of 
a decentralized market economy and to use the market rate of interest for evaluating both 
conventional and environmental capital formation. Alternatively, one could take prescriptive 
approach. This implies that the greenhouse issue is related to the ideas of equity and inter-
generational fairness and high weights are put on the welfare of future generations. Since 
the present paper uses a Ramsey approach, where optimal climate policies are derived 
through maximizing the sum of the discounted logarithm of consumption, the differences 
between a descriptive and prescriptive approach manifest through the choice of the utility 
discount rate. If a prescriptive view is taken welfare is discounted at a rate of 0.5%, whereas 
a 3% discount rate applies, if a descriptive approach is chosen. 
Figures 1 – 4 report the results of our counterfactual analysis. All figures show that over the 
long-run there is convergence to stationary states. Figure 1 illustrates, the long-run atmos-
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pheric carbon stock inversely depends on the choice of the discount rate. This is perfectly in 
line with what we expect from our theoretical analysis (see Section 3). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Atmospheric carbon concentration for high (descriptive) and low (prescriptive) discounting. 
Figure 2 shows hump-shaped consumption paths. Primarily this results from a high initial 
endowment in environmental capital, i.e., carbon stocks below stationary stocks, from which 
present generations can profit as was already mentioned in Section 3. To understand this, 
recall that our model discriminates between three types of capital: physical capital, know-
ledge capital and environmental capital, which is the higher the lower is the stock of atmos-
pheric carbon. The initial endowment of both physical and knowledge capital are below their 
stationary levels, but environmental capital initially is higher than what is optimal over the 
long-term, i.e., the initial concentration of atmospheric carbon is below (modified) golden 
rule levels. Consequently current generations can burn large amounts of fossil fuels to bring 
up the atmospheric carbon stock to the optimal stationary level. Note also, that if a prescrip-
tive view is taken, future generations are favored at the expense of current ones in terms of 
per-capita consumption, an observation which was already reported in Stephan and Müller-
Fürstenberger (1998). 
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Figure 2: Consumption is hump shaped 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that physical capital and knowledge follow a similar pattern. This 
is to be expected as they differ only with respect to output elasticity and depreciation rate. 
Both stocks overshoot. Again this is due to the initial over-endowment in environmental cap-
ital, which allows present generation to extend green world product over stationary levels 
and hence to invest and consume extensively. 
 
 
Figure 3: Physical capital 
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Figure 4: Knowledge capital 
Furthermore, Figures 1-4 show that there is capital deepening in any stock, just as was to be 
expected from the theoretical analysis in Section 3. 
4.3 Invariance result 
Section 3 has established an invariance result in the sense that the stationary stock  of 
atmospheric carbon neither depends on the knowledge stock  nor on the capital stock  
(see Propositions 1 and 2). One way to investigate this result numerically is to vary the prod-
uctivity of technological knowledge, i.e., the output elasticity  of knowledge (see condition 
(2.1)). Ceteris paribus this implies higher investment into the stock of in production and 
hence, higher stocks over the long run. This is exactly what Figure 5 illustrates in case of 
three different values of  (0.2 (baseline), 0.3 (beta_3), 0.35 (beta_35).  
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Figure 5: Knowledge stocks for  = 0.2 (baseline), 0.3 (beta_3), 0.35 (beta_35) 
The invariance result, which is stated in Proposition 2, is shown in Figure 6. More precisely, 
Figure 6 demonstrates that over the long-run there is convergence to a sustainable stock of 
atmospheric carbon, which is independent of the stock of technological knowledge. Howev-
er, as is also obvious from Figure 6 this does not apply in the transition phase. High output 
elasticity of knowledge supports slightly higher atmospheric carbon stocks during transition. 
We call this phenomenon a transitory rebounding effect. 
 
 18 
 
 
Figure 6: Atmospheric Carbon for   = 0.2 (baseline), 0.3 (beta_3), 0.35 (beta_35) 
Figure 7 indicates small long term differences in consumption. However, there are huge dif-
ferences during transition in absolute terms. With a focus on steady states only, consump-
tion is weakly sensitive on the output elasticity of knowledge only. During transition, tech-
nological progress enhances consumption significantly for a long period of time.  
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Figure 7: Consumption for  = 0.1 (low_beta),  0.2 (baseline), 0.3 (high_beta). 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper gives new and surprising insight into the relation between technological change 
and climate policy. By means of a highly stylized integrated assessment model we have 
shown both theoretically and numerically that the stock of technological knowledge has no 
impact on what the optimal carbon stock is over the long run. This drastically simplifies ne-
gotiations on a climate treaty because policy makers need not to agree on expectations 
about future technological change. It simply does not matter for a global long run emission 
target. We are aware that our result does not hold for a more detailed modelling of the en-
ergy sector. But at the very bottom line there is an invariance result.   
Our analysis emphasises once more the key role of the discount rate. Low discount rates 
support strong carbon targets, but at the cost of significant consumption losses for current 
generations. Assuming that there is no exogenous technological change and no population 
growth, our simulations reveal a hump-shaped pattern of consumption. The hump is more 
pronounced for higher discount rates than for lower ones. Given that current carbon stocks 
are below the long-run stationary stocks, there are generations which can heavily benefit 
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from exploiting this gap. Even for low discount rates, future generations may not experience 
the same welfare as do less distant ones.  
6 References 
 
Bernstein, J.I. and T.P. Manumeas (2006). “R&D depreciation, stocks, user costs and pro-
ductivity growth for US R&D intensive industries. Structural Change and Economic Dy-
namics 17, 70-89. 
Birol, F., Keppler, J.H. (2000): “Prices, technology Development and the Rebound Effect”. 
Energy Policy 28:457-469. 
Brännlund, R., Ghalwash,T., Nordström, J. (2007): “Increased Energy Efficiency and the Re-
bound Effect: Effects on Consumption and Emissions”. Energy Economics 29:1-17. 
Burmeister, E., Turnovsky, S.J. (1972): “Capital Deepening Response in an Economy with He-
terogeneous Capital Goods”. American Economic Review 62:842-853. 
Chichilnisky, G., Heal, G., Beltratti, A. (1995): "The Green Golden Rule". Economic Letters 
49:175-179. 
Goulder, L.H., Mathai, K. (2000): “Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Tech-
nological Change”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 39:1-38. 
Hicks, J. (1932), The Theory of Wages. Macmillian, London. 
IPCC (2001), Climate Change 2001: Mitigation. Contributions of the Working Group III on the 
Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge UK. 
Löschel, A. (2002), “Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: a 
Survey”. Ecological Economics 43:105-/126. 
Manne, A., Mendelsohn, R., Richels R. (1995), "MERGE: a model for evaluating regional and 
global effects of GHG reduction policies". Energy Policy 3:1. 
Mas-Colell, A., Winston, M.D., Green, J.R. (1995), Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
Nakicenovic, N. (2002), “Technological Change and Diffusion as a Learning Process”. In Tech-
nological Change and the Environment. Resources for the Future, Washington, 160-
181. 
Nordhaus, W.D (1993), "Rolling the 'DICE': An optimal transition path for controlling green-
house gases." Resource and Energy Economics 15:27-50 
Nordhaus, W. and Boyer, J. (2000), Warming the World. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 21 
Portney, P., Weyant, J., (eds.) (1999): Discounting and Intergenerational Equity. Resources 
for the Future, Washington. 
Romer, P.M. (1990): "Endogenous Technological Change". Journal of Political Economy 
98:71-102. 
Stephan, G. (1995), Introduction into Capital Theory. Springer, Heidelberg.  
Stephan, G., Müller-Fürstenberger, G. (1998), "Discounting and the Economic Costs of Altru-
ism in Greenhouse Gas Abatement". Kyklos 51:321-338. 
  
 22 
Appendix 1: 
A1 Myopic profit maximization 
Let  be a feasible program. At beginning of period t inputs into 
production are:  At the of period t outputs are: , , 
, . Now let  and  denote the present value prices of produced com-
modities and carbon stocks, respectively5
                                                 
5  Note  follows from the fact that carbon stocks  are a bad. For example it could correspond to a tax 
that has to be paid by polluters when increasing the stock of atmospheric carbon. 
. Then short-run or myopic profit function is 
 . 
Therefore solving the myopic maximization problem gives 
(A1) , 
(A2) , 
(A3) , 
(A4)  
The first two conditions are well-known and state that in maximum marginal profits of in-
vesting into knowledge or capital stocks correspond to marginal costs. Production in period t 
generates emissions which negatively affects outputs in period t+1. If these impacts are in-
ternalized, then  is the price, producers at the end of period t have to pay for compensat-
ing an marginal increase of the atmospheric carbon in period t+1. This is what condition (A3) 
tells. On the other side, it follows from condition (A4) that the compensation  produc-
ers receive at the beginning of period t fully compensates losses in marginal output because 
damages are higher (First expression on the left side of (A4)) and less can be emitted (second 
expression on the left side of (A4). By applying some simple manipulations the last two con-
ditions together yield 
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Note, since efficient programs maximize short-run profits, any efficient program fulfills these 
conditions. And since , the function  
is concave. Therefore conditions are both nevessary and sufficient for short-run profit max-
imization. Note finally: If a feasible program is supported by short-run profit maximizing 
prices and if in addition the transversality condition is satisfied, then the respective program 
is efficient. 
A2 Optimality conditions 
the issue of optimal growth was intensively studied (for an overview, see Stephan, 1995). 
However, the results observed cannot be applied directly, since this literature is usually 
based on the assumption that there is free disposal. This means in particular that external 
effects, neither form production nor consumption, are excluded from consideration, which, 
however, is an essential feature of our analysis.  
Now, suppose that the infinite sequence  of carbon, capital and 
knowledge stocks, respectively, defines an interior solution to the optimality problem. Re-
member that condition (2.2) implies:  Then solving the optimality problem 
   
subject to  
(2.3)   . 
gives 
(A2.5)  , 
(A2.6)  , 
(A2.7)   
   
 24 
   
Hence by setting , the Euler conditions imply for any  
(2.5)  , 
(2.6)  , 
(2.7)   
The infinite sequence  can be interpreted as system of present value 
prices. Hence, conditions (2.5) – (2.7) imply that external effects are fully internalized and 
profits are maximized myopically (see Stephan, 1995).  
Since  is concave, we have for any t and any  
  . 
Now, since U(0) = 0, if a solution to the optimality problem exists and  
denotes the corresponding consumption sequence, we observe for any T: 
, which in turn implies the transversality condition 
(2.7)  . 
Summing up, we have established a variant of a well-known result: 
Proposition: An infinite sequence  defines an optimal interior pro-
gram only, if an infinite price sequence  exists such that conditions 
(2,5), (2.6), and (2.7) are fulfilled. 
 
